The Day After Post-Brexit Tomorrow

Written on: 14 August 2018

The Day After Post-Brexit Tomorrow

As the Brexit deadline looms ever closer, Britain’s political classes simply must get its act together and prepare for the impending reality of a UK outside of the EU http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-EU-Without-UK.pdf and more importantly determine to make a success of it. Britain’s’ allies and friends are watching with bated breath to see if Brexit means merely withdrawal from the EU, and not the diminution of Britain’s standing in the world https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-talking-brexit https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/brexit-economic-implications.html — https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/19/europe-wake-up-drastic-financial-consequences-hard-brexit-netherlands-uk — . It’s no wonder that Gulf and North Africa states, a British traditional sphere of influence are watching with consternation as the UK (https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/post-brexit-britain-would-double-down-middle-east-alliances) is distracted with the unfolding permutations of Brexit [https://www.cfr.org/event/british-foreign-policy-post-brexit], and has effectively withdrawn from the region . Its urgent then, that all those who care about Britain’s standing in the world, should regard it in the national self-interest for the UK no longer to dither in its foreign policy (https://www.ft.com/content/0f159492-632b-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 ). Remainers must unite with Brexiters and play their part making the best of a strong Britain outside of the EU, and Brexiters must contribute in articulating a clear vision for Britain outside of the EU, that hitherto they’ve failed to do (https://www.policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/british-foreign-policy-after-brexit-policy-exchange-briefing-july-2016.pdf) . Everyone must ensure that Britain seizes the day and becomes a more nimble global power.

The ideal start is to plan for a post Brexit foreign policy would be a careful bureaucratic review to see what UK’s threats and opportunities are, but as mentioned, the Foreign office is so busy with Brexit that it has little time for the day after (https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-negotiations-government-eu-minister-ivan-rogers-boris-johnson-david-davis-foreign-office-a7508796.html — https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/foreign-office-needs-more-money-to-cope-with-brexit-says-former-chief-diplomat_uk_59f89f6fe4b046017faf088f ). Given all this we are going suggest some priorities. Two simple premises will inform our analysis; how can we minimise ill-effect, if any, for Britain after Brexit, and more positively, what hidden opportunities exist can the UK seize outside of the EU?

One of the most obvious examples is the well-documented migrant crisis affecting Europe (- https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_migration — https://www.hrw.org/tag/europes-migration-crisis ). While the economic upside of migrants is still up in the air (https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/09/29/needed-but-not-wanted — https://iea.org.uk/blog/the-economic-case-for-migration ) , there is little doubt that the political consequences have been catastrophic. Put simply voters across the EU are struggling to digest the change in ethnic and religious demography of their populations (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44632471 — . While policy makers and social scientists busy themselves arguing about the causes of migration (https://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/policy-insight-research/insight/tackling-migrations-root-causes — , and activists are busying themselves with competing narratives of morality of migration )(https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism), policy makers and politicians have to deal with the reality that the political climate across Europe has suffered massive surges in popularity of far-right parties (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/08/the-rise-of-european-populism-and-the-collapse-of-the-center-left/) . There is not a country in Europe where the Far-Right has not come to power e.g. Denmark (https://www.politico.eu/article/meet-denmarks-new-anti-islam-anti-immigration-anti-tax-party-nye-borgerlige-new-right-pernille-vermund/), Hungary (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/how-hungary-became-a-haven-for-the-alt-right/527178/) , Poland (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2017-12-18/rise-polands-far-right), Austria and Italy (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/07/rise-of-far-right-in-italy-and-austria-gives-putin-some-friends-in-the-west) ,or come at least a close second; see France (https://www.ft.com/content/3ba60f06-b34d-11e3-b891-00144feabdc0) , Germany (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/world/europe/germany-merkel-europe.html) , Sweden (https://www.politico.eu/article/sverigedemokraterna-first-we-take-hassleholm-swedish-far-right-rises-ulf-erlandsson-anna-kinberg-batra-stefan-lofven/) , or infiltrated the fringes and wings of hitherto respectable right-leaning parties, e.g UKIP and Conservatives (https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/992780/Brexit-news-John-Curtice-Theresa-May-Chequers-deal-poll-Ukip-Labour-win-warning-latest) . Most ominously, with the incendiary rhetoric of some these populists, its hard not to hear echoes of some of Europe’s darkest moments — https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/europe/denmark-immigrant-ghettos.html_ — https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/18/family-nazi-past-ideology-europe-germany-fascism-far-right) .

So what can Britain do? There are in fact many things Britain can do ; but the most important thing is to have the end in mind. And that end must be that the UK is an indispensable partner to its allies; the rule being the more indispensable it is the more political capital, influence and leverage the UK in a post-Brexit world. And perhaps being part of the EU has made UK complacent and it has forgotten some of its many strengths. It used to be, at least until recently, that UK was Europe’s premier military UK (https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/uk–eu-defence-and-security-cooperation) , with some of the world’s coveted intelligence gathering agencies (https://www.wired.co.uk/article/gchq-tempora-101), and before the downscaling of it’s foreign office, possessor of one the world’s most respected diplomatic corps.

So whilst the Royal Navy can of course patrol the Mediterranean (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/07/uk-military-to-join-nato-refugee-patrols-in-aegean) , such a strategy is akin to chasing the horse once its bolted the stable. With apologies for making analogy even more clumsy, Britain has to work hard on making the stable, homely and strong (https://www.politico.eu/article/valletta-news-migration-mimica/) . With a judicious mixture of hard and soft power, and unique capabilities, Britain can work with governance partners whether states and incipient governments to create havens of stability in a troubled region, and foster stronger norms and cultures of good governance so these havens can establish themselves on a more solid footing .

For example in Libya, the UK has relatively good standing compared to other partners. One hand its diplomats are seen as more honest brokers than other; it’s neither as ideologically wedded to imposing certain ideological frameworks above others, and unlike neighbouring countries will not raise suspicion for having neo-colonial designs on Libya. Furthermore the UK has the hard power to deal with ‘bad guys’ like ISIS (https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/britain-is-at-war-in-libya-and-nobody-thought-to-tell-us-a7052356.html) , and the intelligence capabilities of sifting and figuring out who the good guys actually are. And if it may seem rather mysterious right now if any good guys actually exist, the UK has the diplomatic corps to lay down strict conditionally of what kind of actors will garner support of the international community, and with perhaps with a bit of prodding encourage some parties to step up to these roles.

In Tunisia, Britain should continue help its fragile government to ride out the waves of instability that periodically convulse the country. After the Sousse in June 2016 terror attacks (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/tunisia-beach-massacre-report-questioned-security-sousse-hotel/) and subsequent infighting between the pro France security faction and the pro Britain faction, Britain’s influence over the Tunisian ministry of Interior has led to a more professional and human-rights friendly security service. Issues of bureaucratic inexperience are obvious enough but its experience in Northern Ireland https:/www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1247.html%20_ , can help train security services better balance the needs of security and police work, whilst winning the hearts and minds of local communities, thereby not inflaming the very communities it needs to police and pacify (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9781137284686_9 ). It needs to work with some of its partners to rein in their regional interests all trying to influence various Tunisian partners for their own ends, as well as work with political partners on the ground to make them more aware what exactly the limits of politically possible actually are.

Not only should this foster better relations with countries in the shores of Northern Africa that can create more favourable economic deals in its own right. But it should also in turn, help Southern Europe manage the levels of migration that partly fuel the populist surges that threaten the liberal orders (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/17/the-three-crises-of-liberal-democracy — https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/03/rise-nationalists-guide-europe-s-far-right-parties )currently in ascendance (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/10/how-europes-deteriorating-peace-is-facilitating-the-rise-of-populism/ Its easy for us to forget how briefly some of these countries have enjoyed liberal democracy (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63230/1/democraticaudit.com-Historical%20legacies%20and%20national%20political%20contexts%20have%20shaped%20todays%20far-right%20in%20Eastern%20and%20Centr.pdf ) ; many countries in Western Europe have a long history of communist parties (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/05818.pdf) and fascist parties (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/01/27/is-fascism-back-on-the-rise-in-italy/?utm_term=.be00c7b7af13 ), and in some cases many of these parties have never gone out of existence. All in all, these measures should foster a military dividend that Britain’s military and security capabilities are not currently collecting. It has the additional benefit of reminding its European partners, especially the countries in the so-called ‘soft underbelly of Europe’, that having a humiliated UK is not in their national interest.

But perhaps leaving the EU has one final benefit, something that can be easily forgotten amidst the genuine worries about diminishment of British standing across the world. Perhaps there is some truth to the argument that EU membership has made Britain docile and forgotten some of the instruments available in a complete tool box available only sovereign nations (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/22/south-korea-economy-britain-brexit ). If Britain indeed determines that it wants to continue to punch above its weight and remain a tier one power (https://www.ft.com/content/caf066c6-749f-11e8-b6ad-3823e4384287) , then leaving the EU may force Britain to remember some of the qualities that once made a small rather inconsequential island off the coast of Europe into the great power that it is now. Certainly while the world watches in concern at the unpleasant realities of Britain leaving the EU (https://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-uk-military-britain-pulls-out-of-eu-defense-force/) , its political classes can use it as an opportunity to articulate a more vigorous, nimble and globally orientated vision of United Kingdom’s place in the world (https://www.policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/british-foreign-policy-after-brexit-policy-exchange-briefing-july-2016.pdf ).

Certainly the need of a post-Brexit foreign policy is becoming increasingly urgent, having risen from a whisper to a roar. So while it would be mischaracterisation to say that Middle East, North and West Africa wants the UK out of the EU, it’s no exaggeration to say that friends are looking at the UK to remain a partner for stability and economic growth, and would not be averse to a more globally orientated UK. If the United Kingdom seizes the day and successfully articulates the vision of a global power, if indeed that is what Britain wants to be (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/28/britain-global-military-power-armed-forces-defence-spending) , then it will find the warm embrace of friendship amongst large swathes of the Africa and the Middle East.