Moral Compromises in the shadow of the Sahara
First wrote this on 23 April 2019… Much of it seems still relevant.
France’s clear stance in support of strongmen, going against the wave of popular uprisings in the region, has created a rare opportunity for its competitors to exert regional influence. France’s loss of moral authority in the region is an opportunity for other countries not only to protect their own interests, but to ultimately enhance their position in the region. Even President Macron can see that uprisings are the future in the region, not a blip. Even if one uprising doesn’t succeed there will certainly be others. If France’s leadership cannot wake up to the fact that it has greater shared interests in cooperating with other European states in protecting collective regional interests, that are in conflict with those of gulf states, and the aspirations of the peoples of the region, it must accept the challenges that must arise from its neighbours to its traditional spheres of influence, and its moral standing.
At the beginning of the Arab spring, France offered to support Tunisian president and dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali with security know how and equipment the uprising that soon led to his ousting. More recently, France has overtly supported General Khalifa Haftar’s forces against the UN recognised government in Libya. Both incidents highlight how difficult France has found it over the past decade to reconcile waves of democratisation surging across the Middle East. It has made common cause with moneyed Gulf states that are also suspicious of the popular demands of demonstrators across the region and has further entwined with and deepened its commitment to their interests. Despite this, France’s behaviour in the Middle East has created a rare opportunity for its competitors to exert regional influence.
It’s no secret how much France has benefited from its close relationship with Gulf states through greater investments and arms deals. However, with these states opposing popular demands for greater freedoms and democracy, it has become more difficult for France to adopt a divergent foreign policy from these states. As a result, we have seen an increased Gulf influence on France’s foreign policy, such as taking the lead in the rehabilitation of Egypt’s Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, and more recently in its role in mitigating the damage of the Khashoggi affair on the international stage[1].
France’s policies supporting the Libyan war-lord General Haftar, who operates in close coordination with Gulf states, have inflamed the Libyan conflict and undermined its long-term stability as well as running counter to the collective interest of the European Union and the UK. Its support of an unwinnable military solution ensures the conflict continues in the long-term, attracting a flow of arms that increases the chance of terror activity as well as providing another hotspot to attract jihadist fighters.
Meanwhile, other rival powers stand to benefit from the conflict. Russia’s military support for General Haftar, along with its propensity for selling arms to those who it wishes to influence, is creating a greater foothold in North Africa. China, on the other hand, which has become recently identified as a direct threat to Western interests, has become more and more attractive to African states, and their people, who have come to regard France’s policies in Libya and other African states as a continuation of European colonial legacy, where African treasure is valued over African lives.
Closer to home, with refugees leaving Libya for Western European shores, France’s actions risk fuelling popular discontent about immigration. Because of the risks of disruption to Libya’s oil production, due to the fighting making oil extraction too perilous, an uptick in the price of oil is becoming more likely. In Europe, that means hurting a beleaguered German economy and possible disruption to the UK economy caught up in the uncertainty of Brexit.
Despite all this, France’s support for autocracy in the region is creating opportunities; opposing France’s support of General Haftar not only has the value of being morally superior to France’s stance by being on the side of greater freedom, it has the simultaneous benefit of serving one’s national interest. A great power such as the UK can adopt a policy moderating the Middle Eastern region towards more freedoms, receives the rare boon of its interest based foreign policy and ethical concerns coinciding. This can be done by checking the overt[2] and clandestine[3] influence of Gulf axis states, by creating hurdles in their effort in arming warlords in the region[4], threatening greater scrutiny of their roles in arming and destabilising various regimes, providing support for the UN recognised Libyan government by opposing the narrative that seeks to discredit it,[5] and aid in the insulation of transitioning democracies such as Tunisia[6] from meddling, and at the same time provide support and broach an alliance with Oil and Gas producing Algeria[7] with its concerns over it external security. In addition to that the UK is uniquely placed to contain and hinder coordination between Gulf states, by balancing the various interest of the Gulf region to its advantage.
Opposing policies of the gulf axis -who are fighting the Arab uprisings- will allow a great power to extract concessions, by creating a position that can be leveraged through a simple balance of power policy. It means that by opposing such policies, they create a position that has to be bought out, or a negotiating position where the Gulf must price in the acceptance of that powers policies in the region is created[8]. At the very least it means that Gulf policies take greater heed of a power’s interests in the region. At the same time, they would have invested in a future with alternative victors where different parties are contesting legitimacy and whilst [securing] their own national interests.
Surprisingly it is perhaps Russian foreign policy that best illustrates this; Russia has adopted this strategy in its Syria intervention[9], and less its deft diplomacy in Yemen[10]. In both cases Russia supported opponents of Gulf states, whether Bashar in Syria or the Houthis in Yemen, even as going as far as to supply weapons to their opponents, and even justifying missile strikes on the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia has created a negotiating position, and arguably an acceptance of Russia’s interests. The fruits of this strategy can be seen in Gulf interest in arms supplied by Russia and potential partnership in oil exploration. There is no reason to emulate Russia’s destructive aims against the international order for those vested in it. What is clear that is that European powers are much more directly affected by the adventurism of powers much further away. The EU collectively and the UK have even more reason to balance and check the behaviour of destabilising external actors that have caused unstable hotspots surrounding the Mediterranean that will attract jihadi fighters, activate destabilising migration influxes, which are more likely to be felt in France and other European states, than the far shores of the Arabia Gulf.
If the UK and European powers can shake off their slumber they may recognise that France’s loss of moral authority is an opportunity for them not only to secure the best interest of the region’s people, but guard and even enhance their national interests in what is an increasingly tough neighbourhood. France may yet rue its moral compromises.
[1] https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/france-weighs-interests-in-khashoggi-crisis-saudi-sanctions-an-option/ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-khashoggi-france/french-remarks-on-khashoggi-affair-prompt-turkish-anger-idUSKCN1NH0P1
[2] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-05-05/arms-and-influence-gulf https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yeneb-security-britain/uae-ready-to-take-on-greater-security-burden-in-middle-east-minister-idUSKBN1KG1G6
[3] https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/21/deep-pockets-deep-cover-the-uae-is-paying-ex-cia-officers-to-build-a-spy-empire-in-the-gulf/
[4] https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/19/american-weapons-in-wrong-hands-pub-78408
[5] https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-minister-and-the-ministers-of-state/jean-yves-le-drian/press/article/minister-jean-yves-le-drian-france-is-in-libya-to-combat-terrorism-02-05-19
[6] https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/between-qatar-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-tunisias-quest-for-neutrality/
[7] https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75998
[8] https://agsiw.org/uae-and-russia-find-common-ground-on-syria/
[9] https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesrodgerseurope/2019/01/11/russia-and-syria-prospects-and-prizes/#717194c26852 https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/20/six-components-of-syria-strategy-pub-75843
[10] https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77482 https://agsiw.org/russias-strategic-balancing-act-in-yemen/, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/3/6/Russias-deadly-game-in-Yemen, https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/politics-current-affairs/2019/03/russia-is-helping-iran-extend-its-influence-in-yemen/